Dynamic logic is a logic to reason about the dynamics of (natural or arti cial) systems in general, ranging from the e ects of actions of human agents to the behaviour of arti cial agents and software systems. Therefore it is to be expected that in AI it can be fruitfully employed both to represent knowledge about the dynamics of the domain at hand as well as to describe / specify (the dynamic behaviour of) AI systems themselves. A typical example of the former is the description of the e ects of actions (of humans, for example) in the commonsense world, while the speci cation of a particular reasoning system would be of the latter type. In this paper a number of examples are given to illustrate the usefulness (and wide scope!) of dynamic logic for AI.
Introduction
Originally, dynamic logic has been proposed in computer science as a logic for reasoning about programs in order to verify their correctness. Later it was realised that dynamic logic could also be fruitfully employed as a logic for reasoning about actions more in general. Recently in AI and computer science the concept of an intelligent agent has become in the limelight very much, with both intelligent robots and software agents (softbots) as intended applications. Since the various attitudes an intelligent agent is supposed to possess can be captured as actions operating on a complex mental state, for the logical description of (the behaviour of) agents one might also resort to dynamic logic (which should then be combined with other modal logics to cater for a description of an agent's mental state).
In this paper some examples are given we have encountered during our research in the past decade illustrating how dynamic logic might constitute a basis of a logic for reasoning about actions and agents. These include a range of applications, from database updates to the description of agent attitudes (belief revision, commitments, obligations) and reasoning about actions in a commonsense environment, where we touch upon the infamous frame problem. The paper contains a rather personal choice of topics and the paper is certainly not meant as a complete overview of dynamic logic and its uses. Furthermore, the topics that are treated are only sketched, without providing all the sordid details, to get a avour of them, since a full treatment is beyond the scope of the present paper. (For this the reader is referred to other papers.)
Dynamic Logic As a Basic Logic of Actions
Dynamic logic is a modal logic especially designed to reason about actions. Historically it dates back to work by Vaughan Pratt 40] , Bob Moore 39] , and David Harel 19, 18] , and it has been used for reasoning about programs, thus providing a formalism for program veri cation and speci cation 25, 6] . 1 It is very much akin to Hoare's logic 20] for program correctness, and can in fact be considered as a generalisation of this logic.
In this section we will treat the basic idea behind an elementary form of (propositional) dynamic logic 2 , which will serve as a basis for the later logics in this paper.
Language
For the purpose of this basic treatment we introduce the following logical language L DL . Assume a set P of propositional atoms, and a set A of atomic actions. We will use p q (with possible marks and indexes) to denote elements from P, and a b (with possible marks and indexes) to denote elements from A. De nition 2.1 The logical language L DL and action language L ACT are given as the least sets closed under the clauses:
1. P L DL 2. A L ACT 3. ' 2 L DL implies :' '^ ' _ ' ! ' $ 2 L DL 1 We note that the term \dynamic logic" is somewhat overloaded, since in particular the Amsterdam School in logic employs the term for a dynamic interpretation of classical (nonmodal) logic, mostly used in linguistic applications, such as for a formal treatment of discourses 16] . This branch of \dynamic logic" will not be treated in this paper, although we'll touch on it when we'll consider multiple agent updates in section 7.2.1. 2 Propositional Dynamic Logic or PDL is due to Fischer & Ladner 13] 4. ' 2 L ACT implies + 2 L ACT Here we see that the logical language L DL is an extension of propositional logic with modal operators of the form ] (and duals h i) where is an element from the action language L ACT . This action language is here taken to be a very basic programming language, viz. that of the regular expressions over action alphabet' A. The` ' operator denotes sequential composition (`followed by'),`+' means (nondeterministic) choice, and` ' denotes arbitrary nite repetition. (This choice of operators is`classic' for dynamic logic (cf. 18, 25, 50] ) in this paper also di erent operators such as`&' (parallel composition) and`' (action negation) are employed, but in this section we'll restrict ourselves to the familiar ones.) Finally the action expression '? stands for a test whether the logical expression ' holds in the current state. This is typically used in an expression involving a choice operator to guide control of this choice, as in e.g. the expression p? a + :p? b, where p 2 P and a b 2 A.
Models
The language L DL is given an interpretation on the basis of Kripke-models, as is usual for a modal language. We will use tt and ff for the truth values. 
The Logic PDL
The simple propositional dynamic logic introduced above can be nitely axiomatized by the following system: We note that taking di erent choices for the basic operators in the action language, and especially further extensions to these, has a large in uence on the axiomatisation. This is the reason that sometimes a quite di erent axiomatic system is obtained. However, as the above system is rather standard in the literature (e.g. 50]), we have presented it here as a basis.
Dynamic Update Logic
Since dynamic logic is suited par excellence for reasoning about the dynamics of systems, it may also be used for the description of performing updates on a database (or information system more in general). The last two axioms are minimization axioms: they state that if recursive atoms are true, then there must be an \external reason" for this the atoms in a mutual dependency group cannot be true only because other atoms in this group are true. If a recursive atom in such a group is true, then the completion formula for some atom in the group must be true, even if the recursive atoms in the completion formula are replaced by ff.
In 48] it is shown that this axiomatization of PDDL is complete with respect to so-called full structures. (In that paper also a complete axiomatization is given for all structures, but we will not elaborate on this here.) Next in 49] this idea is generalised to the rst-order case, which of course in the context of databases is almost a`must'. In fact in this paper two update logics are proposed, both based on ( rst-order) dynamic logic.
The rst one is Relational Algebra Update Logic (RAUL), which can be viewed as an extension of relational algebra with assignment. The second logic is Dynamic Database Logic (DDL) in which the atomic updates are updates of the extension of predicates and assignments, which are updates to the values of attributes construed as updatable functions. DDL can be viewed as a true extension of PDDL to the rst-order case. We will not go into this here further, but refer to 49] for this, and restrict ourselves here to a brief sketch of RAUL.
In RAUL we consider as actions typically assignments of the form p := e, where p is a predicate symbol, and e is a relational algebra expression, which has a relation (i.e., a set of tuples) as its meaning. 
Dynamic Semantics of Reasoning Systems
In the previous section we have seen how dynamic logic can be applied to describe the dynamics of updating a database or an information system more in general. In the case of active updates this also involved some reasoning already due to the logic program stored in the information system that served as a background theory, in particular pertaining to derived atoms. Of course one may turn to a more advanced system of reasoning. Also such more advanced reasoning systems themselves can be analyzed by means of dynamic logic. The basic idea behind this is that reasoning systems like any other dynamic system display a certain behaviour that can also be thought of being brought about by reasoning steps. These may be`classical steps' like applying deduction, but { and in AI this is even more important { also reasoning steps in a`non-standard' logic or reasoning system. One may, for instance, think of default reasoning, but there are many other examples as well.
Descriptive Dynamic Logic
For example, Sierra et al. 46 ] have applied dynamic logic for analysing / describing reasoning by means of a re ective (multi-language) architecture, where typical reasoning steps include`re ection' steps, such as moving from an object level to a meta-level where one e.g. may reason about one's knowledge and ignorance on the assertions on the object level. More in general in multi-language architectures one employs so-called bridge rules to infer / transfer / translate information between two di erent units (that is to say, languages or, if one thinks more in terms of an implementation of such an architecture, modules). Of course also inferences within a unit may take place.
In their set-up called Descriptive Dynamic Logic they tailor (propositional) dynamic logic to suit their purpose by taking as atomic formulas so-called \quoted" formulas of the form k : d'e, where k is a unit identi er denoting a unit u k of the system, and ' is a formula in the language of that unit.`Subatomic' programs are inferences (deduction steps) by means of (intra-unit or inter-unit) inference rules, written as d;`k l 'e, where k and l refer to the units u k and u l in the system, respectively (if k = l, we have an intra-unit inference), and ; is a set of formulas in the language of u k and ' is a formula in the language of u l .
Atomic programs in the sense of propositional dynamic logic are now taken to be non-deterministic choices of subatomic actions. 3 For instance, we have atomic actions like`k l = S f j is of the form d;`k l 'eg, where S stands for the nondeterministic choice of the subatomic actions that are given to it as argument.
In this language one may express the case where a unit u k is endowed with the modus ponens inference rule by the (valid) formula: after application of a step d;`i j e every atom p di erent from j : d e that is true was already true before application (informally, of course, since the step has no bearing on such an atom).
In 46] a complete axiomatisation of the logic is given. Furthermore it is also indicated how this logic might be used to describe a re ective architecture for non-standard reasoning methods like default reasoning.
Dynamic Deontic Logic
In this section we consider another application of dynamic logic, viz. reasoning about the deontics of actions. Deontic logic itself is an old branch of philosophical (modal) logic dating back to Mally 32] , but which has become a serious subject of study since the seminal work of Von Wright 54, 55] . Deontic logic is the logic of obligation, prohibition, and permission and can, in principle, be applied both to obligated / forbidden / permitted states of a airs and obligated / forbidden / permitted actions. In the literature these two forms of deontic logic have been referred to as ought-to-be and ought-to-do logic, respectively, and it is mostly not made explicit which form is treated / meant. In 34] an explicit ought-to-do logic has been proposed, based on dynamic logic. The main idea here was inspired by work of Anderson 1] , who tried to reduce deontic logic to alethic modal logic. The crux of his idea was that something (') is forbidden i violation of the constraint ' has some undesirable e ect. In 34] this idea is applied explicitly to actions: an action if forbidden i performing it leads to an undesirable e ect. This is easily formalised in dynamic logic.
The Logic PD e L
In order to reason about the deontics of actions we take the following language, where we assume a special propositional constant V 2 P, denoting a state of violation' of a deontic constraint.
De nition 5.1 The logical language L DeL and action language L ACT0 are given as the least sets closed under the clauses:
Thus in the language we use for deontic purposes we employ a slightly di erent set of action operators, viz. sequential composition, alternative composition (choice), parallel composition and action negation(!). The latter is a little nonstandard in dynamic logic. It expresses that the action is not performed. This construct will enable us to express the obligation of an action below.
Models for the language L DeL are like those for L DL , but of course, one has now to cater for the operators & and . Since we like the (interpretations of) the operators to satisfy the rules of a Boolean algebra, this is (surprisingly) rather involved (due to the presence of the sequential composition` '), so that we do not give its full de nition here. Here it su ces that & and are very much resembling an intersection and complement operator on the accessibility relations (like + is resembling an union operator) (cf. 34, 9]). 4 We can now de ne the deontic operators as abbreviations as follows:
De nition 5.2 F ]V, i.e., the action is forbidden i performing leads to a state of violation P :F , i.e., the action is permitted i it is not forbidden Obl ]V, i.e., an action is obligated i not-doing it leads to a violation.
Although the basic ideas behind these de nitions are very simple indeed, it leads already to some interesting deontic properties:
Although these properties are rather intuitive, one might consider alternative approaches with (slightly) di erent ones. For example, in legal reasoning it is not always the case that everything that is not forbidden is automatically permitted, so that one might also consider a class of actions that is neither (explicitly) forbidden nor (explicitly) permitted (cf. e.g. 47] ). Sometimes also a property like (Obl _ Obl ) ! Obl( + ) and, hence, Obl ! Obl( + ) is considered undesirable. This property is called Ross's paradox, and it is counterintuitive if one reads the choice operator in such a way that the agent is free to choose its alternatives him/herself: \if one ought to mail the letter, then one ought to mail the letter or burn it" sounds counterintuitive in this reading. Deontic logic traditionally has a history of such paradoxes. 5 Another paradox was discovered by Van der Meyden 33] concerning permission in our approach, where only the`end' situation is decisive as to whether the action is permitted: P( ) $ h iP is equivalent with P( ) $ h i(h i:V), which has as a consequence that doing resulting in a violation state while then doing resolving the violation is permitted according to our de nitions. So this is a kind of \ the end justi es the means" approach, and while this might be acceptable for some applications, it is obviously not the case for all uses / readings of permission, so that one should then use a stronger notion. In fact several of these alternatives have been proposed. We ourselves have also considered alternatives to deal with these so-called paradoxes (e.g. 9]), but most of them can be viewed harmless once one realizes what exactly the meanings of these are, and one is then able to` ne-tune' these notions to one's needs.
Deontic logic can be employed for the representation of knowledge in domains where obligations, permissions and prohibitions occur directly, such as the legal reasoning domain 41], but its application goes beyond that. It has also been proved very useful in the description of systems where it is important to distinguish ideal from actual behaviour. Ideal behaviour is then speci ed by using deontic operators which can then be well distinguished from actual behaviour. So here we see that there are more or less implicit (ideal) constraints that can be (actually) violated by the system. Examples of such systems include fault-tolerant software systems 5], but also information systems such as databases where there may be so-called soft constraints that every system state ought to / should satisfy, but again might be violated 38]. It has recently been recognized that being able to represent such a violation (by e.g. the use of deontic operators) is very helpful to specify for instance a way to recover from such a violation. Soft constraints typically occur in systems where not all actors / agents in the system are under complete control and have a certain autonomy so that they can choose themselves to violate these constraints. A commonsense example would be an automated library system where nevertheless the people borrowing books may choose to return their books too late according to the library's regulations.
6 Typical E ects of Commonsense Actions and the Frame Problem
In AI there has been considerable e ort to give an adequate treatment of reasoning about actions in a commonsense context. It has appeared to be a very hard problem to describe the e ects and particularly the non-e ects of actions. This problem has become known as the frame problem. Related problems include the speci cation of the necessary preconditions for an action to be performed successfully (or intendedly), also known as the quali cation problem, and the precise determination of the derived e ects of an action, the rami cation problem (cf. 43]). Although there has been a lot of research on this problem and de nitely some progress have been made, I believe that in general the frame problem and its related problems remain highly problematic. The problem is the space of possible (non-) e ects and preconditions / quali cations and ramications is potentially in nite, or at least astronomical in practical cases, so that it is virtually impossible to give such a precise speci cation in those cases, and neither do we really want to. What is searched for is a`convenient' method to deal with this problem, which triggered a lot of research in nonmotonic reasoning (such as default reasoning) with the idea in mind that`by default', unless explicitly speci ed or deduced otherwise, aspects / features of the world remain the same. (This is sometimes called`inertia', but one has to bear in mind that this has nothing to do with physics, but rather with the reasoner's mental laziness to reckon with all conceivable changes/preconditions/rami cations of the world due to the performance of some action! But this laziness on the part of the reasoner is not to be blamed on him, since s/he has to act in the world in a real-time fashion...)
Preferential Action Semantics
In 35] an approach to the speci cation of actions dealing with some of the issues mentioned above is proposed which is based on the use of dynamic logic (inspired by work reported in 31] using the di erent but related framework of Dijkstra's weakest precondition calculus as well as the Features and Fluents approach as taken in 42]). Essentially this approach consists of specifying per action which aspects of the world, in this area often called features, are de nitely set to some value, which are framed, that is subject to inertia, and which uents are considered to be truly variable, expressing that their values may be nondeterministically change during the execution / performance of the action at hand. In the literature on action changes and the frame problem it has proved to be also useful to sometimes`release' features temporarily from being framed (i.e. being subject to inertia) so that they become temporarily variable (cf. e.g. 42, 24] and a conditional composition operator. Moreover we include compositions by means of the operators # (preferred behaviour). Note the lack of a sequential composition in this language. 6 To render semantics to these action expressions, we need to x some things rst. First of all, we endow an atomic action a 2 A with a`signature' (set a frame a release a ), where set a frame a release a F, and release a frame a , describing the status of the feature variables w.r.t. this action: set a is the set of feature variables that are set by a, frame a is the set of variables that are framed while performing a, of which the variables in release a are released in the sense we mentioned above. For convenience we also use the abbreviations inert a = frame a nrelease a for the feature variables that are subject to inertia while performing action a and var a = Fn(set a frame a ) for the feature variables that are`truly variable', i.e. are known to be subject to change of their values in a nondeterministic way.
In this context we de ne a state s as a function: F ! V, where V is a set of feature values (in many examples this set may be taken to be the booleans). 
the rst expressing that the expected states after execution of an action constitute a subset of the possible states after executing that action the second that concerning all possible successor states those of are a superset of those of the parallel execution k and the third expressing that the expected states after the execution of the restricted choice between two actions is a subset of those resulting after a liberal choice.
Typical non-validities are:
the rst stating that in general the set of expected states when executing an action is not a superset of the set of expected states when executing that action in parallel with some other action the second that the expected states after the execution of the restricted choice between two actions is generally a proper subset of those resulting after a liberal choice.
Interestingly, in this approach preferred behaviour in terms of applying inertia when possible is explained in terms of`concurrency': if no concurrent events (or actions as performed by other agents) are known to interfere, the behaviour of the action at hand in which inertia is applied to the inert variables is preferred. Thus, for example, the preferred behaviour of a wait action, viewed in isolation is the same as that of the skip action, the interpretation of which is the identity function, while viewed in a concurrent context we may have to take into account the interference of other events. (This is di erent from the approach proposed in 31] where the wait action is simply identi ed with the skip action.) In 35] we show how typical AI scenarios involving inertia like the infamous Yale Shooting Scenario can be treated adequately in this set-up.
Specifying Intelligent Agents
In the philosophical literature the term`agent' is often used to refer to the (human) subject who knows, reasons or performs acts. Recently in computer science the term`(intelligent) agent' has become popular to refer to intelligent pieces of software (or hardware) that perform`intelligent' tasks autonomously, that is, in a way that is not directly dependent on the user's actions / requests 56, 23] . Typical examples of software agents (or softbots) are personal assistents to help and guide the internet user through the ever increasing and perhaps already almost impenetrable jungle of the World Wide Web. Of course, another example of these arti cial agents are robots that should be able to reason and perform intelligent tasks. In this section we will use a modal logic based on dynamic logic to describe or specify the behaviour of such intelligent agents, thus providing a theoretic framework on which the realisation of these artefacts may be founded.
Single Agents
First we will discuss the behaviour / attitudes of a single agent in isolation. In the next subsection we will see what issues have to be tackled when`societies of agents' are studied. We give a simpli ed treatment of our work reported in 26, 27, 28, 37].
Agent Attitudes
Typical agent attitudes include, besides the ability of acting(!), possession and maintenance of knowledge / belief, and intentional or motivational ones, such as the possession and maintenance of desires, goals and commitments. These attitudes may be described in a logic that consists of dynamic logic, enriched with (modal) operators dealing with such notions as ability, opportunity, knowledge, belief, desires and goals. So we enrich the language with operators A O K B D G. 7 Moreover, we introduce special actions revise and commit in the language to deal with revision of knowledge / belief and the performance of commitments (which can be seen as an operator that revises the agent's agenda).
De nition 7.1 The logical language L SA and action language L ACT SA are the least extensions of the languages L DL and L ACT , respectively, that are closed under the clauses:
To interpret this extended language we need also to extend our models: De nition 7.2 A Kripke model for L SA is a structure M of the form hS r t R K R B R D Agendai, where S is a non-empty set (the set of states) 7 We mention here also related work 22] in which a so-called preference-based action logic is proposed based on dynamic logic in which goals are expressed as well. The main di erence between this logic and ours is that Huang et al. use a blend of dynamic logic, preference logic (where preferences are taken in the sense of Herbert Simon), (a kind of) conditional logic and Veltman's update semantics, and de ne goals in these terms and preferences in particular. Their work is more motivated from the perspective of social science and particularly organisation theory than from our standpoint of specifying and realising an intelligent system. : S ! (P ! ftt ffg) is a truth assignment function to the atoms per state r t : L ACT SA ! 2 S S are state transition relations per action, satisfying the properties of De nition 2.2, as well as some constraints regarding the revise and commit actions, to which we will return in the sequel. The r transition relation models the transition resulting from performing an action, with respect to the aspect of the agent's opportunity (provided by the environment) to perform the action, regardless of its ability to perform this action, whereas the t transition relation models the transition resulting from doing the action, with respect to the aspect of the agent's (internal) capability to perform the action, regardless whether it has the actual opportunity to do so (cf. 21]) (practical possibility) P( ') A ^O ^h i', i.e., an agent has the practical possibility to do an action with result ' i it is both able and has the opportunity to do that action and the result of actually doing that action leads to a state where ' holds (can) Can( ') KP( '), i.e., an agent can do an action with a certain result i it knows it has the practical possibilty to do so (realisability) 3' 9a 1 : : : a n P(a 1 : : : a n ') 9 , i.e., a state property ' is realisable i there is a nite sequence of atomic actions of which the agent has the practical possibility to perform it with the result ' (goal) G' $ :'^D'^3', i.e., a goal is a formula that is not (yet) satis ed, but desired and realisable. 10 (possible intend) I( ') Can( ')^KG', i.e., an agent (possibly) intends an action with a certain result i the agent can do the action with that result and it moreover knows that this result is a goal of his.
We are now in a position to state the constraints for the revise and commit actions. Given a L SA -model M, we de ne the semantics of these actions as model/state transformers:
1. r(revise')(M s) = update belief(' (M s)), and likewise for t(revise') 2. r(commit )(M s) = update agenda( (M s)), if M s j = I( ') for some ', otherwise r(commit )(M s) = (indicating failure of the commit action), and likewise for t(commit ). Here update belief and update agenda are functions that update the agent's belief and agenda, respectively. Their formal de nitions can be found in 26, 28] and 37]. The revise operator can be used to cater for revisions due to observations and communication with other agents, which we will not go into further here (see 28] ). Note that the revise and commit action are`model-transforming' actions rather than`state-transforming' ones as is the usual interpretation of actions in dynamic logic. This should not surprise us too much, since these actions change the mental state of the agent, which in our Kripke-style representation involves (part of) the whole model rather than just one (the actual) state.
Besides the familiar properties from epistemic logic (see e.g. 12, 36]), typical properties of this framework, called the KARO logic, include (cf. 26, 37]):
.2 Actions with Typical E ects
As we have seen before, when we reason about actions we have to take care of an economic speci cation of the e ects and, perhaps even more importantly, the non-e ects of actions. The same problem, of course, holds for actions as performed or initiated by agents. As we have also seen, a way to do this is to consider default or typical e ects of actions. In 11] it has been attempted to incorporate this in an agent setting, more in particular in a KARO-like logic. Here we discuss the main idea(s) of their approach.
Firstly to the logical language a new construct h i' is added with as intended reading that the agent has the opportunity to perform the action and as a result of this event ' holds (always) and typically holds. The typical e ects (and the semantical function r ) come into play in a rather sophisticated way. So-called scenarios are introduced, which more or less consist of a sequence of actions = 1 : : : n together with a pre-and postcondition, pre and post , respectively. Next a so-called epistemic path is de ned as a sequence of states in the model < s 0 : : : s n >, such that s 0 satis es pre , s n satis es post , and the s i are such that r( )(s i s i+1 ) holds. 11 (In terms of dynamic logic it thus holds in s 0 that pre^ ] post .) The state s n is called an end state of the scenario. Now in this path it is counted how many of the s i are in fact atypical, i.e. such that :r ( )(s i s i+1 ) holds. If a path has less atypical states than another, it is more preferred. This is used to de ne a preference-based nonmonotonic inference relation between scenarios and formulas as follows: SC j (where SC is a scenario) i for every end state s of the most preferred epistemic paths with respect to the scenario SC it 11 In this simpli ed account I leave out the requirements regarding capabilities. holds that M s j = . We thus see here a sophisticated mixture of dynamic logic (or rather the KARO logic) and nonmonotonic inference techniques in order to treat typical results / e ects of actions.
Real World Agents
When considering agents that operate in the real world, such as robots, also a lot of additional uncertainty comes in. For example, when a robot gets information from sensor devices this may contain errors, both random and systematic ones. The same holds for the other actions that agent performs in the real world. Executing a command of moving ahead for 2 meters may result in actually moving ahead for 1,9 meters. This depends on the devices (e.g. wheels) within the robot that actually achieve such a command but also on the environment (e.g. being on a slippery oor or on a slope). To treat the behaviour of a real world agent properly one has to resort to means of describing such forms of uncertainty in the agent's dynamics. There has been some work on this already 17, 44, 45] . In 52, 53] we are now trying to bring probabilistic reasoning within the framework of dynamic logic. As the work is still in a preliminary stage I restrict myself to an informal description of the main idea. As before we treat actions of the agent as model-transformers. However, these models now contain also probabilistic information. Roughly one can say that the`state' of a real-world agent is given by a set of possible worlds with a probability distribution, indicating the probability that the agent is in that particular world. Now, for instance an observe action will result in a new`state' described by a set of possible worlds where possibly some worlds have been eliminated and the probability distribution is adjusted according to Bayesian reasoning. This models the fact that by observation the agent learns something about the state it's in (cf. 52]). Other actions (like a move) are given by a transition to a model in which every possible world is replaced by a set of worlds with a probability distribution on them re ecting the agent's uncertainty (for example, with respect to its position in the case of a move action) after execution of the action 53].
Multi-Agent Systems
In the agent systems community it is appreciated that probably the most interesting and useful applications of such systems will involve a number of agents (possibly even very many). These systems have great potential in applications such as electronic commerce. To describe, specify and realise such multi-agent systems (MAS) one needs to go beyond the individual level of agents (such as a description of their mental states / attitudes), but one has also to pay serious attention to social attitudes / behaviour of the agents in such a system. Things that naturally come to mind here are communication, co-ordination, negotiation, co-operation and the like. Although it is not entirely clear how much of this can be speci ed by purely logical means (it is, for instance, quite obvious that other theoretical concepts and techniques such as stemming from decision and game theory are of crucial importance to obtain an adequate description), it is nevertheless interesting to investigate whether logic (and dynamic logic in particular) is also of some help in this context. Some work in this direction has been done already.
Epistemic Group Updates
For example, in 2] the issue of belief updates within a MAS has been considered. The generalization of belief updates from the single agent case to the multiagent one is by no means trivial, since one should take care of an adequate representation of whose belief is updated and whose is not! For instance, if agent i communicates to agent j some information such that another agent k is not aware of this, the knowledge/belief of agent k, and in particular his beliefs about the beliefs of agents i and j (!), should remain una ected. Whereas in the single agent it is su cient to eliminate`arrows' in the Kripke model (re ecting the elimination of epistemic possibilities) this is not an adequate procedure any more in the multi-agent case. Baltag et al. solve the problem by adding arrows instead. The main idea is that, for instance in the previous example, the epistemic relations of agent j change (by eliminating epistemic possibilities), from the perspective of agent k things should remain the same, so that his accessibility relations should still point to worlds where the agents i and j have still the old epistemic possibilities. Precisely this e ect can be obtained by copying the old model (for agent k) as well as adding a submodel dealing with agents i and j in isolation.
In 15, 14] related work is reported from a more linguistic perspective, using the framework of Veltman's update semantics 51]. 12 Here group updates of the form U G are considered, denoting the update of group G by means of action or`program' . These programs are either tests '?, group updates again, or sequential or alternative compositions of programs. A sound and complete axiomatisation, based on dynamic logic, is given with typical axioms such as:
The former is called the privacy axiom, since it expresses that the belief of someone who is not involved in the group update will not change its beliefs. The latter is called the Ramsey axiom it expresses that after a group update with action an agent believes ' just in case s/he already believed that after executing an update with U G could only result in a world where ' would be true. (This is related to the so-called Ramsey test in philosophical logic.)
Communication and Speech Acts
Another example of the use of (dynamic) logic for describing MAS is that pertaining to communication. Dignum and Van Linder 8] have attempted to deal with agent communication by means of dynamic logic. The idea here is to view communication between agents as speech acts, that is to say actions by means of speech, so that it becomes amenable to a logic for reasoning about actions such as dynamic logic. In fact they use a rather sophisticated mixture of the KARO logic from the previous subsection and (a re nement of) dynamic deontic logic from section 5, since in their set-up some speech acts may give rise to obligations! (E.g. they have an operator Obl ij such that Obl ij expresses that agent i has an obligation to agent j to perform action .) Furthermore, of course, in a multi-agent setting it must be indicated who is performing the action. We do this here by employing the notation do i ( ), denoting that agent i is performing the action . They consider the following speech acts: commitments, directions, declarations and assertions, formalised by the actions:
1. COMMIT(i j ) denoting the act of commitment of agent i to agent j to perform the action .
2. DIR(i j ) denoting the act of agent i directing agent j to perform action . 3. DECL(i ') denoting the act of declaration of i that ' holds. 4. ASSN(i j ') denoting the act of agent i asserting to agent j that ' holds.
Without going too much into the details of the rather involved semantic framework, it should come as no surprise that these actions are given a modeltransforming interpretation again (like the revise and commit actions for single agents we saw before). Su ce here to say that 1. COMMIT(i j ) changes the model in such a way that afterwards there exists an obligation of i to j to perform , i.e. Obl ij holds.
2. DIR(i j ) changes the model such that afterwards j has an obligation to i to perform . The action only succeeds if the agent i has the authority to give this directive.
3. DECL(i ') changes the model such that ' holds in all resulting states, provided that ' is consistent, and the agent i has the authority to perform this declarative action.
(The action ASSN is similar to the multi-agent belief update we have seen before, and I leave it out here.) Typical formulas that are valid in this framework are thus: Of course, the behaviour of a non-trivial multi-agent system with possibly many heterogeneous agents involves much more than their knowledge and the speech acts between them. Also more complex social attitudes are to be investigated and described. Examples include negotiations, co-ordination of behaviours, cooperation and competition, delegation, trust, coping with joint intentions and goals, but also`fault-tolerant' behaviour in the sense that if one agent fails to accomplish a task for some reason, another can take over or can at least take some compensatory action. Although already interesting work has been done on these issues (cf. e.g. 4, 7] 13 ), I believe that there is still a lot to be done here. Obviously a comprehensive and adequate treatment of these matters needs elements from game and decision theory (or theory of economics more in general) as well as the theory of distributed computing. On the other hand, since it is obvious that here, too, (the description of) dynamics plays an important role, there is no a priori reason to doubt the use of dynamic logic based on the idea of social actions viewed as transformers of models capturing these social attitudes in this context as well. I think it is a very interesting issue to study where and how these`extra-logical' elements such as the ones mentioned above may t in.
Conclusion
In this paper I have reviewed a number of di erent instances of knowledge representation involving agents, actions and changes, in which it has been proven (or at least made plausible) to be fruitful to employ dynamic logic as a basic action logic. From the instances shown I believe the wide applicability of dynamic logic is clearly demonstrated. Of course, in each speci c application domain the bare dynmic logic has to be`embellished' to increase expressibility, but dynamic logic remains the`core' of the resulting system. Of course, to reason about the dynamics of (intelligent) systems one might also consider alternatives. A prominent`rival' of dynamic logic is temporal logic, the logic of time 3], which has also been put to use for the purpose of the veri cation and speci cation of programs. Although there are some similarities between dynamic and temporal logic (e.g. both are modal logics, and both can be used to descibe the (temporal) behaviour of systems), a main di erence between the two is that in dynamic logic the actions (and perhaps even the actor) involved are mentioned explicitly in the object language, while this is not the case in temporal logic (although, of course, one may add additional predicates to express aspects of actions). In my opinion both temporal and dynamic logics have their merits, and may be convenient tools for di erent applications.
